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Sehrawat: Autonomous Weapon System and Command Responsibility

AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEM AND COMMAND
RESPONSIBILITY
Vivek Sehrawat*
Abstract
Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS) are gradually becoming
incorporated into warfare as technology advances and capabilities
increase. The challenge of ensuring the responsibility for acts of an AWS
poses some significant challenges. Under International Humanitarian
Law (IHL) and international criminal law, individuals are criminally
responsible for any war crimes they commit. It is unclear who can be held
responsible for deaths and war crimes committed by AWS. This Article
is focused on human-out-of-the loop weapons. This Article outlines the
legal theory of command responsibility, which international criminal
courts may apply to achieve responsibility. This Article examines the
individual and state responsibility, and a test for determining command
responsibility is conducted. Further, this Article discusses the intent and
command responsibility, international criminal law framework for AWS,
and the search for criminal culpability. Finally, this Article provides four
solutions for command responsibility in relation to AWS.
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INTRODUCTION
The legality of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is an important
issue under international law as technology advances, and machines
acquire the capacity to operate without human control.1 The advent of
AWS creates new challenges that need to be addressed. AWS poses
significant challenges to ensuring the responsibility for its acts.
Individuals are criminally responsible for war crimes under International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and international criminal law.2 Also, they can
be held responsible under different modes of liability, such as for
attempting, assisting, facilitating, aiding, abetting, planning, or
instigating the commission of a war crime.3 However, it is unclear who
can be held responsible for deaths and war crimes committed by AWS.
People demand responsibility and accountability.
AWS are gradually becoming incorporated into warfare with the
advancement of technology and increased capabilities of sensors,
analytical capabilities, and their integration in response to the increasing
tempo of military operations.4 Also, AWS are incorporated because of
political pressures to protect combats, civilians, and property.5
Automation in weapons systems will be a general feature across
battlefield environments, and genuine autonomy in weapons will
probably remain rare for the foreseeable future.6
Also, AWS are different from the remote-controlled weapon systems,
like the Predator and Reaper drones that the United States (U.S.) has. In
AWS, an onboard computer chooses the targets and makes decisions
autonomously without a human in the loop.
* Vivek Sehrawat is an Assistant Professor of Law at BML Munjal University. He has
extensive research and publication experience in legal issues relating to National Security,
international humanitarian law, international law, and privacy law. Vivek conducted extensive
research on drones during his SJD at University of Kansas. After finishing his SJD, he joined
University of California, Davis as a Visiting Scholar. At Davis, he continued his work on drones
as well as the legal implication of autonomous weapon systems. From that research, he authored
this book. At Davis, he worked on the UN Human Rights in the field of cultural rights projects
with the Special Rapporteur Karima Bennoune. He served on the editorial board of the UC Davis
Business Law Journal during his LLM.
1. Vivek Sehrawat, Autonomous weapon system: Law of armed conflict (LOAC) and other
legal challenges, 33 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV.: THE INT’L J. OF TECH. L. AND PRAC. 38 (2016).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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The incremental evolution of AWS technologies should be recognized
for the future to address the legal and ethical dilemmas; the U.S. should
assume the foreseeability of AWS and build policies towards resolving
these ethical dilemmas.7 Prohibitory treaties are unworkable and ethically
questionable because there are certain yet gradual development,
deployment, and humanitarian advantages created by the precision of
these systems.8
Scholars and researchers have taken a number of approaches to
address the responsibility issues posed by AWS. Scholars such as Robert
Sparrow has argued that no one will be responsible because it is not
possible to describe any responsibility for the behavior of AWS to a
human.9 Other scholars, such as Peter Asaro, believe that AWS will
eventually be responsible for their actions.10 A number of other possible
loci of responsibility for AWS war crimes are canvassed: the persons who
designed or programmed the system, the commanding officer who
ordered its use, and the machine itself. Punishing a machine for
autonomous decisions is inappropriate and impractical.
According to Human Rights Watch, three human actors can be held
responsible for the crimes committed by an AWS. These are
commanders, programmers, and manufacturers.11 However, opponents
have identified several flaws with each of these potential candidates for
responsibility.12 Prosecuting three human actors individually and
successfully is challenging because it is necessary to prove the intention
or knowledge of AWS.13 Also, several scholars offered rules or informal
laws for designers and users of artificial agents to encourage a clear
allocation of responsibility.14 For example, Keith Miller initiated and led
a collective effort to develop a set of rules for ‘moral responsibility for
computer artifacts.’15 According to the rules, there is a shared
responsibility for the designer, developer, and commander of the
computer artifacts.16 The rules indicate that these people will take

7. Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Law and Ethics for Robot Soldiers, 2 (COLUM.
PUB. L. RES. PAPER 12-313, 2012).
8. Id.
9. Robert Sparrow, Killer Robot, 24 J. OF APPLIED PHIL. 64, 66 (2007).
10. Ida Verkleij, Fully Autonomous Weapon Systems (2016) (unpublished Master’s thesis,
Tilburg University) (available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=141890).
11. Id.
12. Daniel Hammond, Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15
CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 652, 654 (2015).
13. Sehrawat, supra note 1.
14. Deborah G. Johnson & Merel Noorman, Recommendations for Future Development of
Artificial Agents, TECH. AND SOC’Y, Jan. 2014, at 2.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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responsibility for AWS when they consider the sociotechnical systems in
which the artifact is embedded.17
Similarly, Robin Murphy and David Woods developed three laws of
responsible robotics, intended as alternatives to Asimov’s three rules
from I-Robot.18 According to Murphy and Woods’ laws, robots should
be designed to be responsive to humans.19 For example, “A human may
not deploy a robot without the human-robot work system meeting the
highest legal and professional standards of safety and ethics.”20
Also, few scholars considered holding a state accountable as feasible
for crimes committed by AWS.21 Indeed, hardly any scholars questioned
the desirability in theory or feasibility in practice. 22 Yet, no scholar
created a coherent definition of autonomy in weapon systems from a
command responsibility perspective under IHL. This often results in the
conflation of legal, ethical, policy, and political arguments.
AWS is divided into three categories based on human involvement in
their actions:
•

Human-in-the-Loop Weapons: AWS that can select
targets and deliver force only with a human
command;

•

Human-on-the-Loop Weapons: AWS that can select
targets and deliver force under the oversight of a
human operator who can override the robots’ actions;
and

•

Human-out-of-the-Loop Weapons: AWS that are
capable of selecting targets and delivering force
without any human input or interaction.23

Human-out-of-the-loop weapons are the primary concern; however,
human-in-the-loop and human-on-the-loop weapons can also raise
concern.24 Human-out-of-loop weapons are more dangerous because
human decision making is completely removed from the process.25

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Hammond, supra note 12.
22. Id.
23. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW
SCHOOL, LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS (2012).
24. Amos N Guiora, Accountability and Decision Making in Autonomous Warfare: Who is
Responsible?, 4-2017 UTAH L. R. 393, 397 (2017).
25. Id.
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Human decision making reflects consideration, deliberation, reflection,
and doubt.26 This Article is focused on human-out-of-the-loop weapons.
This Article assumes that AWS are not illegal weapons, and they may
be used under certain circumstances. Some scholars believe that AWS
are illegal under existing law. For example, their use cannot meet the
requirements of international human rights and IHL principles of
distinction and proportionality during the armed conflict.27
This Article outlines the legal theory of command responsibility,
which can be applied by international criminal courts. This Article
discusses the origins of command responsibility and responsibility
concerns with AWS. It examines the individual and state responsibility
and conducts a test for the determination of command responsibility.
Further, this Article discusses the intent and command responsibility, the
international criminal law framework for AWS, and the search for
criminal culpability. Finally, this Article provides four solutions for the
command responsibility in relation to AWS. In this Article term
“accountability” and “responsibility” are used interchangeably.
I. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Discussion of command responsibility doctrine is important for a
better understanding of this Article. The doctrine of command
responsibility includes two concepts: (1) direct command responsibility:
the commander can be held directly responsible for the order and (2)
indirect command responsibility: the commander can be held responsible
for the acts of his subordinates.28 The second concept is based on the
commander’s failure to act when under a duty.
A. Elements of Command Responsibility
There are three elements of command responsibility:
(i)

the existence of superior-subordinate relationships
characterized by effective control over subordinates;

(ii)

knowledge or constructive knowledge by the
superior that his subordinates are about to commit or
have committed genocide, crimes against humanity
or war crimes; and

26. For a fascinating, important, and in-depth discussion of this issue see DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
27. CHRISTOF HEYNS, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS:
TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS 45 (Mar. 26–28, 2014).
28. Verkleij, supra note 10.
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failure to adopt reasonable and necessary measures
to prevent, punish or report the offenses.29
B. The Origins of Command Responsibility

This section discusses the historical background of the command
responsibility in two sections, i.e., pre-World War II and post-World War
II.
1. Post-World War II
The concept of command responsibility originated centuries ago. In
around 500 BC, Sun Tzu wrote about the duty of commanders in Ping
Fa - “the Art of War” to ensure subordinates conduct in armed conflict.30
In 1439, Charles VII of Orleans promulgated an ordinance, requiring each
captain or lieutenant will be held responsible for the abuses, ills, and
offenses committed by members of his company.31 The captain will be
held responsible if the offender escapes and evades punishment because
of his negligence or otherwise.32 In 1474, the first international
recognition of commanders’ obligations to act lawfully occurred during
the trial of Peter von Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal in the Holy Roman
Empire.33 Von Hagenbach was convicted of murder, rape, and other
crimes which he should have prevented as a knight.34 However, the
Tribunal did not explicitly rely on a doctrine of command
responsibility.35 In the seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius wrote, “A
community or its rulers may be held responsible for the crime of a subject
if they knew of it and did not prevent it when they could and should
prevent it.”36
In 1779, the British Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, Henry Hamilton,
was captured and tried for depredations committed by American Indians
allied with the British during the American Revolution.37 “It is
noteworthy that the language of the indictment held that the acts of the
Indians were the acts of Hamilton. He was considered personally liable

29. NICHOLAS TSAGOURIAS & ALASDAIR MORRISON, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 337–67 (2018).
30. EUGENIA LEVINE, GLOBAL POL’Y FORUM, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: THE MENS REA
REQUIREMENT (Feb. 2005).
31. GARY SOLIS, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. IN WAR 382 (2010).
32. Id.
33. LEVINE, supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. SOLIS, supra note 31.
37. Id.
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for the acts of subordinates.”38 The notion of command responsibility is
controversial in consolidating the customary international law rule.39
2. Post-World War II Developments Concerning the Mens Rea of
Command Responsibility
The doctrine of command responsibility linked to the criminal
responsibility and its jurisprudence is developed after World War II.40
The doctrine of command responsibility was first utilized formally after
the end of World War II in war crime prosecutions.41 Command
responsibility has ancestries in the IHL principle of responsible
command, under which commanders have to ensure that their
subordinates respect IHL.42 Under the command responsibility, the
commander becomes criminally labile for the failure to prevent or punish
offenses of the subordinates.43 Therefore, Command responsibility is a
powerful tool for enforcing compliance with IHL.44 Command
responsibility was left almost untouched for forty years after World War
II, and later a number of issues were clariﬁed and introduced in the
Statutes of the International Criminal ad hoc Tribunals.45
Also, in modern times, the issue of responsibility is important. In the
military context, commanders and soldiers are subject to disciplinary
sanctions and courts-martial for mundane or serious offenses.46 The
essence of command responsibility is that commanders may suffer
career-ending consequences.47 A system without command responsibility
is directly contrasted to the IHL principles.48 Decision making and
responsibility are directly related.49 States authorize “Kill or not kill”
decisions and standards of responsibility are not inherent or integral in
authorizing the new Wild West.50

38. Id.
39. Micaela Frulli, Exploring the Applicability of Command Responsibility to Private
Military Contractors, 15 J. OF CONFLICT & SEC. L. 435, 437 (2010).
40. Id.
41. TSAGOURIAS & MORRISON, supra note 29.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Frulli, supra note 39.
46. Guiora, supra note 24, at 398.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 397.
49. Id. at 398.
50. Id.
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Command Responsibility Under the Rome Statute of the ICC Article
25(3) provides:
A person shall be criminally responsible and liable for
punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court
if that person:
(b) Orders solicits or induces the commission of such a
crime, which in fact occurs or is attempted.51
IHL Customary Rule 153 says that:
commanders and other superiors are criminally responsible
for war crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew,
or had reason to know, that the subordinates were about to
commit or were committing such crimes and did not take all
necessary and reasonable measures in their power to prevent
their commission, or if such crimes had been committed, to
punish the persons responsible.52
State practice establishes the applicability of command responsibility
rule as a norm of customary international law in both international and
non-international armed conflicts.53 Individual criminal responsibility for
war crimes and crimes against humanity is important and continually
established by the contemporary international criminal tribunals and
courts, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for former
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court.54 In the
twenty-first century, with the advancement of technology, imposing
criminal liability is challenging for an individual for the act of a machine.
II. RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNS WITH AWS
The delegation of human decision-making responsibilities to an AWS
is the moral and legal issue because they are designed to take human
lives.55 The operational constraints are critical from an ethical point of

51. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IHL DATABASE, PRACTICE RELATING TO RULE 152,
COMMAND RESP. FOR ORDERS TO COMMIT WAR CRIMES.
52. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, IHL DATABASE, RULE 153, COMMAND RESP. FOR
FAILURE TO PREVENT, REPRESS OR REPORT WAR CRIMES.
53. Id.
54. Jack Beard, Autonomous Weapons and Human Responsibilities, 45 GEO. J. OF INT’L L.
617, 642 (2014).
55. Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems: Human Rights, Automation,
and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-making, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 687, 695
(2013).
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view.56 There are some grave and core concerns with the use of AWS for
targeting humans as an AWS does not have human agency, intent, moral
responsibility, and human dignity.57
Ceding the use of force and life-and-death decisions to the machines
instead of humans raises fundamental ethical questions. According to
ICRC, responsibility and accountability for decisions to use force cannot
be transferred to a machine or a computer program.58 These are human
responsibilities—both legal and ethical—which require human agency in
the decision-making process.59 Therefore, a closely related ethical
concern raised by AWS is the risk of erosion—or diffusion—
responsibility and accountability for these decisions.60
Matthias refers to this issue as ‘the responsibility gap.’61 AWS can be
programmed to learn as they operate, and because of this learning, the
fear is that no humans—even the programmers of the agents—will not be
able to understand the decision making of artificial agents.62 Hence, no
human can fairly be held responsible for the action of artificial agents.63
However, there are several possible scenarios for the responsibility of
AWS war crimes; designer or programmer, the commanding officer who
ordered its use, and the machine itself.64 Also, some scholars identified
States to be held responsible for filling the responsibility gap.
The responsibility concern remains a challenge for the legal scholar,
and none of these are satisfactory. Responsibility is a necessary condition
under the principle of IHL that someone can be held responsible for war
crimes.65
III. RESPONSIBILITY FOR AWS
The responsibility for AWS can be divided into two categories:
individual responsibility and state responsibility. If AWS possesses no
agency or legal personality of their own, then the individual(s) can be
held criminally responsible for their role as operators, commanding
officers, programmers, engineers, technicians, or other relevant
56. Neil Davison, Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Ethical Basis for Human Control?,
HUMANITARIAN L. & POL’Y (Apr. 3, 2018), https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/04/03/
autonomous-weapon-systems-ethical-basis-human-control/.
57. Id.
58. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ETHICS AND AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: AN
ETHICAL BASIS FOR HUMAN CONTROL? 2 (Apr. 3, 2018).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Johnson & Noorman, supra note 14.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Sparrow, supra note 9.
65. Id.
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functions.66 If the deployment of an AWS seriously violets IHL, then the
individuals can be criminally prosecuted for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, or genocide.67 Also, a state can be held responsible for the
development and deployment of AWS. The following sections discuss
the individual responsibility and state responsibility.
A. Individual Responsibility
There is consensus among delegations of the Group of Governmental
Experts that humans should be held legally responsible for the
autonomous decision making powers in targeting, and AWS cannot be
considered criminally responsible.68 Ultimately, humans should be held
criminally responsible because they are involved in the deployment of
AWS.69 This falls under the cardinal principles of criminal law that
human action is a prerequisite for criminal responsibility. Also, under
international criminal law, war crimes can only be committed
by individuals and not by robots.70
Additionally, the supervisor could be held liable if the AWS engage
in an illegal and unreasonable target because a supervisor is involved in
the deployment of the AWS.71 Also, the Department of Defense’s
Uniform Code of Military Justice provides punishment for violations by
military personnel, such as dereliction of duty and murder.72
Accountability for the supervisor who actively monitors the AWS
through a live feed would be similar to the tactical commander who
orders and specifies a mission for the AWS.73 In both scenarios, the
supervisor and the commander would not actively be in the AWS’s
decision loop.74
Commander is expected to maintain operational control of the AWS
as with any military equipment under their command.75 A programmer
could be held liable for knowingly deploying an AWS that is unable to
66. Nikolas Sturchler & Michael Siegrist, A “Compliance-Based” Approach to
Autonomous Weapon Systems, EJIL:TALK! (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/acompliance-based-approach-to-autonomous-weapon-systems/.
67. Id.
68. Marta Bo, Who is Criminally Responsible for the Commission of War Crimes When
Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems are Deployed in Armed Conflicts?, THE GRADUATE
INSTITUTE GENEVA (Sept. 21, 2018), https://graduateinstitute.ch/communications/news/whocriminally-responsible-commission-war-crimes-when-lethal-autonomous-weapon.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Michael Press, Of Robots and Rules: Autonomous Weapon Systems in the Law of Armed
Conflict, 48 GEO. J. OF INT’L L. 1337, 1363 (2018).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1364.
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satisfy the principle of distinction during war; similarly, the commander
could be held liable if they allow such a system to operate. 76 Also, the
commander can be held liable if the commander later learns of the faulty
AWS operation, causing civilian deaths, and fails to investigate or hold
subordinates accountable.77
The first element of command responsibility needs to be satisfied, i.e.,
the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship. The challenge here
is who is superior and who is subordinate. If the commander is superior,
then AWS becomes subordinate. “The scenario where any such person
would say ‘the machine did it’ is easy to imagine.”78 According to this
element, AWS needs to be punished, but that is not possible. Another
scenario could be if the programmer is subordinate, then the commander
could be punished.
Then there is the second element, i.e., knowledge or constructive
knowledge by the superior that his subordinates are about to commit or
have committed genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. In this
scenario, it will be challenging to justify that the commander knew about
the AWS committing war crimes. In another scenario, when a chip goes
off or if a problem occurs with the software, then it will be challenging
for a programmer or manufacturer to determine the fault, which might
result in war crimes.
The third element is the failure to adopt reasonable and necessary
measures to prevent, punish, or report the offenses. It will not be possible
to punish AWS. The reasonable and necessary measure to prevent
offenses is to ban the AWS or to punish the developer of AWS.
The concept of responsibility for the actions of AWS is challenging
and unclear.79 Implementing robust responsibility standards and criteria
is uncertain because the decision making is largely removed from the
commanders.80 Therefore, the machine that took the unpredictable
decision would be the argument because computers act randomly, and
they operate in complex environments.81 The interactions between the
system and the surroundings cannot be foreseen.82 If responsibility is
assigned by law in theory, in practice, those who activate AWS may find
sympathy from judges and others who have to assess their conduct.83 The
danger of an accountability gap remains in theory and practice.84
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
HEYNS, supra note 27, at 46.
Id.
Guiora, supra note 24, at 419.
HEYNS, supra note 27, at 46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Professor Michael Schmitt’s views, accountability contentions
“muddled” the debate about AWS.85 He observes, it is not difficult to map
out the accountability allocation: “Clearly, any commander who decides
to launch AWS into a particular environment is, as with any other weapon
systems, accountable under international criminal law for that decision.
Nor will developers escape accountability if they design systems,
autonomous or not, meant to conduct operations that are not IHL
compliant.”86
Similarly, Professor Armin Krishnan said that the “legal problems
with regard to accountability might be far smaller than some critics of
military robots believe.”87 He views that if “the robot does not operate
within the boundaries of its specified parameters, it is the manufacturer’s
fault.”88 Also, if the AWS is “used in circumstances that make its use
illegal, then it is the commander’s fault.”89
Case in point: An IDF battalion commander was given an order to
detain three suspected terrorists in Nablus.90 When approaching the city,
the commander received an urgent update from his intelligence officer
that while spotters had located the suspected terrorists, they were
surrounded by school-age children.91 The commander had, according to
his analysis, three options: (1) cancel the mission; (2) proceed with the
mission, regardless of the consequences to the children; or (3) engage in
“cat and mouse” with the terrorists.92 The commander decided to cancel
the mission.93 He reasoned that the costs of collateral damage did not
outweigh the benefits accrued from arresting the three, and the mission
could be achieved at a later date.94
This example highlights both the issue of responsibility and the
consequence of minimizing and importance of human input in decision
making.95 Responsibility is the essence of command.96 The command
structure is dependent on the proper delegation of responsibility and
accountability.97 Combats and commanders depend on a command
85. Charles Dunlap Jr., Accountability and Autonomous Weapons: Much Ado About
Nothing?, 30 TEMPLE INT’L & COMP. L.J. 63, 68 (2016).
86. Id. at 69.
87. ARMIN KRISHNAN, KILLER ROBOTS: LEGALITY AND ETHICALITY OF AUTONOMOUS
WEAPONS (2009).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Guiora, supra note 24, at 420.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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structure that ensures military discipline, clear lines of command, a
confirmation of systemic and institutionalized principles of
accountability and responsibility.98
Additionally, human actors can be held responsible for direct and
indirect command responsibility. In direct responsibility, the commander
can be held responsible for ordering his subordinates to carry out
unlawful conduct.99 In indirect responsibility, the commander can be held
liable for a subordinate’s unlawful conduct and failure to act. However,
there should be standard operating procedures for AWS to hold personnel
accountable, which can be achieved by creating regulations and standards
of care. This will help personnel know what actions committed by the
AWS implicate personal responsibility.100
Also, it can be under the perpetrator responsible for failing to act.
Under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for repressing grave breaches
targets persons who have committed or ordered the commission of such
breaches.101 Commanders can be held criminally liable for not acting and
allowing a grave breach.102 For example, failing to act when killing
someone by withholding food, proper care, and the grave breach of
depriving a prisoner of war of the right to a fair trial.103
Article 86 (1) Additional Protocol I of 1977 is more explicit:
The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict
shall repress grave breaches and take measures necessary to
suppress all other breaches of the Conventions or of this
Protocol, which result from a failure to act when under a duty
to do so.104
Article 85 of Additional Protocol I refers to grave breaches that are
generally committed by a failure to act, such as the unjustified delay in
repatriating prisoners of war or civilians.105 Existing mechanisms for
legal accountability are ill-suited and inadequate to address the unlawful
harms of AWS might cause.106 Individual responsibility is a challenging
concept because the human element is absent from the decision making
in AWS, and also there are multiple individuals involved in the use of

98. Id.
99. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, ADVISORY SERVICE ON INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND FAILURE TO ACT (Apr. 2014).
100. Press, supra note 71, at 1363.
101. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 99.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MIND THE GAP, THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER
ROBOTS (Apr. 9, 2015).
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AWS. States should incorporate punishment for the commander,
designer, and programmer for the acts of AWS.
1. State Responsibility
Under the State responsibility, a State could be held liable for
violations of IHL resulting from the use of an AWS. Also, under
international law governing the responsibility of States, they would be
held responsible for internationally wrongful acts, such as violations of
IHL committed by their armed forces for using an AWS. 107 A State will
also be responsible if it deploys an AWS without adequately testing and
reviewing.108
The UN Group of Governmental Experts overlay the Tallinn
Manual’s articulation of state responsibility with AWS.109 If the Tallinn
Manual’s criteria for state responsibility for cyber warfare were co-opted
to apply to AWS, then states would be responsible for the acts committed
by AWS under two conditions: (1) When the act of an AWS is attributable
to the state under international law; or (2) When the AWS act constitutes
a breach of an international legal obligation applicable to the States.110
For example, if an AWS malfunctions resulting in harm or killing of
innocent civilians in a foreign combat environment, i.e., a breach of an
international legal obligation, then (1) the act would be attributed to the
state employing the technology and (2) the state would be held
accountable for breaching an international legal obligation to protect the
innocent civilians.111
States are responsible for wrongful acts under international law that
are attributable to AWS, but this does not extend to criminal
responsibility.112 States can be held accountable for human rights
violations and can be required to cease unlawful actions and pay
compensation.113 However, this does not frequently happen for IHL
violations.114 The role of States for accountability could play a potentially
important role in deciding which weapons to acquire, and the obligation
of weapons review.115
107. NEIL DAVISON, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE: AUTONOMOUS
WEAPON SYSTEMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 16 (2016).
108. Id.
109. Jessica Malekos Smith, Imagining a Killer Robot’s First Words: Engineering State-inthe-Loop Legal Responsibility for Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems, HARV. KENNEDY SCH.
REV. (July 12, 2018), https://ksr.hkspublications.org/2018/07/12/imagining-a-killer-robots-firstwords-engineering-state-in-the-loop-legal-responsibility-for-fully-autonomous-weapons-systems/.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. HEYNS, supra note 27, at 46.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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UN Charter governs the recourse of the threat or use of force by
States.116 States have a duty to control or supervise the development,
employment of AWS, and usefully define and exert.117 For example, it is
sufficient to rely on superior programming and strict reliability testing to
make an AWS predictably compliant with IHL for its intended
operational parameters.118 Thus, it would be permissible to restrict human
involvement to the proper activation of such an AWS.
As Professor Michael Schmitt points out, “States can be held
accountable under the laws of State responsibility armed forces use AWS
in an unlawful manner.”119 Ultimately, the support for employing AWS
must be conditioned on their potential to mitigate suffering in war and the
international community’s ability to abide by State responsibility.120
IV. INTENT AND COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
Intent is an important aspect of proving criminal liability under
command responsibility and international law. A commander cannot be
held criminally responsible without proving the intention to commit a
crime. Some scholars believe AWS would lack certain human
characteristics, such as judgment, compassion, and intentionality.121
AWS has the potential to commit criminal and unlawful acts that would
constitute a crime if done with intent, for which no one could be held
responsible.122 An AWS itself could not be responsible for criminal acts
that it might commit because it would lack intentionality.123 For example,
an AWS would have the potential to direct attacks against civilians, kill
or wound a surrendering combatant, and launch a disproportionate attack;
they are elements of war crimes under the Rome Statute of the ICC.124 By
contrast, AWS could not have the mental state required to make these
crimes; because they would not have moral agency, they would lack the
independent intentionality that must accompany the commission of
criminal acts to establish criminal liability.125
However, the UK defines an automated system as “. . . programmed
to logically follow a pre-defined set of rules with predictable outcomes,”
whereas an autonomous system is “. . . capable of understanding higherlevel intent and direction.”126 An AWS would be capable of
116.
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120.
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124.
125.
126.
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understanding, perceiving its environment, and deciding a course of
action from a number of alternatives without depending on human
oversight and control.127 According to the UK, AWS’s activities would
be predictable.128
Human commanders or operators could be assigned direct
responsibility for the crimes of an AWS in exceptional circumstances.
For example, if a programmer intentionally programs an AWS to commit
war crimes, he or she could be held accountable.129 Even if the
programming occurred in peacetime, the programmer could be held liable
for committing or assisting a war crime if the AWS carried out the
activities during the armed conflict.130 Therefore, the programmer or
operator could be held accountable if they acted with criminal intent in
programming or at least has knowledge of the AWS’s criminal act, and
the intent has to be proven. However, there are significant challenges in
proving intention and holding anyone responsible for an AWS’s conduct
under international criminal law.131 The lack of human control and
unpredictability of AWS makes it challenging to find individuals
involved in the programming and deployment criminally liable for war
crimes because commanders and programmers may not have the
knowledge or intent required for such acts.132 This leaves a command
responsibility gap.
Command responsibility does not require the commander’s direct
criminal responsibility for crimes committed by his subordinates, but for
culpable failure to prevent, suppress or repress crimes committed by
persons, i.e., not machines, under his or her command and control.133
Also, a commander’s failure to control AWS operating under his or her
command may constitute a direct violation of the duties of precaution,
distinction, proportionality, or any other obligation imposed by IHL.134
The functions of human soldiers are increasingly “delegated” to AWS. It
may become appropriate de lege ferenda to extend the commander’s
supervisory duty, mutatis mutandis, and by analogy, also to AWS
operating under his direct command and control.135
Direct command responsibility is explained in Article 7 (1) of the
ICTY statute and Article 6 (1) of the ICTR:

127.
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A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or
execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime.136
Therefore, direct command responsibility can be established for the
positive acts of the commander.137 In AWS, “ordering” is the most
applicable action of the commander.138 According to the actus reus (an
illegal act) of “ordering” a crime requires that the commander should
order to subordinate to commit an offense.139 Such a commander can be
de jure, de facto, or reasonably implied.140 It is sufficient if there is some
proof of authority on the part of the accused.141 To establish the mens rea
requirement (intent) for “ordering” a crime, it must be proven that the
commander ordered an act with the awareness of the substantial
likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of the order.142
The mens rea of the accused does not need to be explicit but may be
inferred from the circumstances.143
The human commanders or operators could not be held directly
responsible for the wrongful acts of an AWS without proving intent.
Also, imposing criminal punishment on the programmer or manufacturer
will be challenging and unreasonable for the wrongful acts of AWS.144
Therefore, it would be challenging to identify a specific individual with
the intention to commit crimes in the complex development and
manufacturing chain.
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW FRAMEWORK
Command responsibility doctrine is a complex form of criminal
responsibility. IHL is the most relevant body of international law
governing the development and employment of AWS in armed
conflicts.145 Also, there are other branches of international law, such as
human rights law, impose limits on the use of force in armed conflicts,
and international criminal law governs individual criminal responsibility
for violations.146 The principle of individual criminal responsibility is one
136.
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of the core principles of IHL for war crimes.147 Punishing individuals for
war crimes are significant in the enforcement of IHL.148 The provisions
of international law can be enforced by punishing individuals who
commit war crimes because crimes are committed by humans, not by
abstract entities.149
A. AWS and the Search for Criminal Culpability
There is the possibility if once engaged in the battlefield, AWS will
target people and objects in violation of IHL rules on the methods of
warfare because there is no human control involved in AWS’s decision
making. Therefore, there is a need to search the criminal culpable for the
deployment of AWS. If AWS cannot be prosecuted because it is a
machine for the crimes, this possibility offends not only the rule of law
but also the more visceral human desire to find an individual culpable.150
In several domestic legal systems, civil lawsuits can be filled to hold
individuals and companies responsible for the failure of machines.151
Consumers in various countries, particularly the U.S., are protected under
national product liability and safety laws that allow them to bring civil
lawsuits against corporations for harm caused by manufactured or sold
goods.152 These lawsuits are usually based on various types of negligence,
including manufacturing and design defects, failure to take proper care,
avoid foreseeable risks, failure to warn, or provide reasonable
instructions.153 Scholars also suggested similar civil lawsuits as an option
for incentivizing AWS manufacturers to produce harmless weapons.154
For example, in the domestic system, Nevada has passed legislation
imposing criminal liability as well as civil liability in driverless cars.155
Driverless cars may not technically be ‘fully’ autonomous, but they are
de facto similar because a driver’s capability to intervene atrophies over
time to the point of ineffectiveness.156
However, Human Rights Watch claimed that individual civil
damages-by victims of illicit use of an AWS could not “fill the gap” they
perceive to exist in the criminal law.157 Their discussion mainly centers
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on the complexity of the U.S. tort liability litigation generally, rather than
weapons’ law or the law of war.158
In United States v. Kick, the all-civilian Court of Military Appeals
explained the necessity to criminalize behavior that breached the
relatively low standard of simple negligence in the military.159
There is a special need in the military to make the killing of
another as a result of simple negligence a criminal act. This
is because of the extensive use, handling, and operation in
the course of official duties of such dangerous instruments
as weapons, explosives, aircraft, vehicles, and the like. The
danger to others from careless acts is so great that society
demands protection.160
This illustrates the existing U.S. military law anticipates and
recognizes the dangerous potential of weapons and imposes
accountability even when “intentionality” is absent; therefore, Human
Rights Watch wrongly thinks that intent must be present to impose
criminal liability.”161 Indeed, this is just a sampling of the myriad of ways
that, contrary to what Mind the Gap implies, any competent prosecutor
could successfully pursue accountably when an AWS is employed.162
Additionally, under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice Article
119 of manslaughter, criminalizes behavior where the accused “who,
without an intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm” yet “unlawfully kills
a human being . . . by culpable negligence.”163 “Therefore, involuntary
manslaughter may be established by “a negligent act or omission which,
when viewed in the light of human experience, might foreseeably result
in the death of another, even though death would not necessarily be a
natural and probable consequence of the act or omission.”164 It is possible
to impose criminal liability on anyone involved in the culpably negligent
use of an AWS.165
Also, the ICRC states that acting willfully includes acting with
“wrongful intent” or “recklessness,” which it describes as “the attitude of
an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the
possibility of it happening.”166 The ICRC distinguishes this from
“ordinary negligence or lack of foresight,” which occurs “when a man
158. Id.
159. Id. at 72.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, United States, pt. IV ¶ 44 art. 119(b) (2012).
164. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, United States, pt. IV ¶ 44 art. 119(c)(2)(a)(i) (2012).
165. Dunlap Jr., supra note 85, at 72.
166. Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous Weapons, 164 UNIV. OF
PA. L. R. 1347, 1377 (2016).
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acts without having his mind on the act or its consequences (although
failing to take necessary precautions, particularly failing to seek precise
information, constitutes culpable negligence punishable at least by
disciplinary sanctions).”167
At present, there is little sense in attempting to hold AWS liable.168
Artificial intelligence has not advanced to a point where a robotic system
could be said to act intentionally or recklessly.169 If a violation of IHL is
not a war crime absent some willful action, AWS are currently incapable
of committing war crimes.170 Additionally, traditional justifications for
individual liability in criminal law—deterrence, retribution, restoration,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation—do not map well from human beings
to robots.171 There is a need for more to find the fine line between
appropriate risk mitigation and respect for personal culpability to
establish criminal liability.
B. Solutions
The advent of AWS creates new challenges that need to be addressed.
This section provides a different possible solution for AWS, keeping the
doctrine of command responsibility in view. There is a need for a new
legal framework for the AWS. This section presents the four possible
solutions for the legal framework of AWS.
1. Existing Legal Framework
Some scholars argue that, while specific convention-based
prohibitions may be lacking, AWS must, like all weapons, be used in
compliance with applicable customary international law as reflected in
the IHL framework.172 Also, in the existing legal framework for
command responsibility laws from international criminal tribunals,
international criminal law and ICC statute of Rome can be applied. States
and individuals can thus be held responsible for violations of IHL
obligations involving the use of any weapon, depending on the facts of a
particular case.173
However, the problem with these existing legal frames is that they are
not designed to deal with modern technologies like AWS, where the
human element is missing from decision making. It will be feasible to
have new sets of laws that specifically govern the modern weapons of
warfare, such as AWS.
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2. Banning AWS
Another possibility is that certain weapons may be classified as
illegitimate under the IHL framework.174 In the latter case, states are
prohibited from employing such weapons under any circumstances
because they are illegal per se.175 However, as mentioned above, this
Article is not about the legality of AWS and banning AWS. This is about
providing a solution to the issue of command responsibility.
3. Autonomous Defense Systems
AWS can be developed just for defense purposes and banning all
offensive AWS. For example, Iron Domes are autonomous as they can
identify, track, and engage targets without human interference.176 Iron
Domes are intelligent, i.e., they can discriminate between projectiles that
pose significant threats and projectiles that will ultimately fall in
unpopulated areas and “strictly defensive,” i.e., the system is utilized in
a way that causes no immediate offensive advantage to its user and does
not directly harm enemy combatants or enemy civilians.177
After 2011, the Israel Defense Force has used the Iron Dome system
to shoot down over 1,700 unguided rockets and mortar shells launched
by militants in Lebanon, Syria, and the Gaza Strip against Israeli
communities.178 An Iron Dome battery can also engage aircraft, drones,
large artillery shells, and possibly even cruise and ballistic missiles.179
Another example, according to NBC News, South Korea installed
stationary robots, developed by Samsung Techwin and Korea
University.180 The Samsung SGR-1 patrols the border between North and
South Korea called the Demilitarized Zone.181 Assistant Professor
Heather Roff at the University of Denver said the SGR-1 was initially
built with the capability to detect, target, and shoot intruders from two
miles away.182 She said, “In that sense, it’s a really sophisticated
landmine, it can sense a certain thing and can automatically fire.”183 But
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Daphne Richemond-Barak & Ayal Feinberg, The Irony of the Dome: Intelligent
Defense Systems, Law, and Security, 7 HARV. NAT’L SEC’Y J. 469, 494 (2016).
177. Id.
178. Sebastien Roblin, This is Iron Dome (Israel’s Rocket Crusher): Everything You Need
to Know, NATIONAL INTEREST (May 5, 2019), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/iron-domeisraels-rocket-crusher-everything-you-need-know-56057.
179. Id.
180. Guia Marie Del Prado, These Weapons Can Find a Target all by Themselves-and
Researchers are Terrified, BUS. INSIDER (July 30, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/
which-artificially-intelligent-semi-autonomous-weapons-exist-2015-7?IR=T.
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Peter Asaro, the co-founder of the International Committee for Robot
Arms Control, told NBC News that South Korea received “a lot of bad
press about having autonomous killer robots on their border.”184 That is
the reason now the SGR-1 can only detect and target but requires a human
operator to approve the kill shot.185 It is converted into semi-autonomous.
Another usage could be undertaking sustained surveillance, marking
targets, gathering intelligence, deterring adversaries, and carrying out
strikes in hostile territory, with the guiding hand of a human operator.186
But the development of semi-autonomous weapons are secretive, and it’s
unclear what part humans play in choosing and firing on targets.187
Using Iron Dome or semi-autonomous systems might provide a
solution for the command responsibility because they are used for
defensive purposes and, therefore, minimizes the casualties. Also, they
have a human element; therefore, it is feasible to hold the commander
liable.
4. Standard Operating Procedures for AWS
AWS are a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and
computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an
onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without manual
human control of the system.188 Therefore, it will be unfair to apply laws
of other weapon systems that have a human element, and war crimes
cannot be measured with the existing laws and standards. It creates a
situation to look for different laws and regulations for AWS.
A key step to holding personnel accountable is the creation of
regulations and standards of care that can provide notice to personnel on
the standard operating procedures for AWS so that such personnel knows
what actions committed by the AWS implicate personal responsibility.189
A key adjustment that must be made is the introduction of a militarycreated standard for the operation of AWS.190 This standard will set how
such AWS may be used in accordance with the law of war.191
The establishment of such a standard operating procedure would also
address accountability concerns by helping to establish a standard of care
below which liability may be imposed on the human commanders of
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DEFENSE PRIMER: U.S. POLICY ON LETHAL
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AWS.192 This accountability would ensure, at least partially, that the
confidence of commanders would be balanced and reasonable.193
Establishing standards of design, maintenance, and operation would aid
in providing expectations for personnel so that this balancing effort would
not be an excessively difficult or time-intensive endeavor.194
Also, separate command responsibility doctrine for modern
technology such as drones and AWS should be created. Keeping legal
advisors at hand in establishing these regulations, and within the decision
process when they are carried out, would also be valuable.195 For
example, Professor Keith Miller’s Moral Responsibility for Computing
Artifacts: The Rules, can be considered.
CONCLUSION
If AWS are to be treated with other weapon systems, then
commanders and others within the chain of AWS design, maintenance,
and operation should be culpable for the actions and potential IHL
violations committed by AWS.196 This Article outlined the legal theory
of command responsibility. It examined the individual and state
responsibility, and a test for determining command responsibility is
conducted. Further, this Article discussed the intent and command
responsibility, the international criminal law framework for AWS, and
the search for criminal culpability. Finally, this research provided four
solutions for command responsibility in relation to AWS.
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